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DIRECT DEMOCRACY IN POLAND. BETWEEN 
DEMOCRATIC CENTRALISM AND CIVIC LOCALISM 
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One of the inherent elements of democracy is citizens' participation 
in public life. The most frequent ways of realization of political 
participation are universal elections and direct democracy 
institutions. The aim of this article is to compare the level of 
application of direct democracy mechanisms at the local and 
national level in Poland. The research was inspired by diverse 
institutional positions of direct democracy instruments in the Polish 
political system. The national ones are based on the Constitution of 
1997, which gives them the status of high significance. But on the 
other hand, especially regarding formal conditions, it functionally 
limits their possible application. Local direct democracy 
institutions are normatively based on lower order acts (laws), 
which are much easier to amend. Hence, they are more adaptable 
to changing political and social conditions. The authors’ research 
confirmed the thesis that the use of direct democracy mechanisms 
is more intensive at the local level. As a continuation of their 
research, the authors reflect on the determinants of this situation, 
making six hypotheses. 
 
Key words: direct democracy; referendum; legislative initiative; 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
One of the inherent elements of democracy, being both its prerequisite and 
necessary condition, is citizens' participation in public life. If there is no 
universal political participation, the form of civil society is impaired, which 
eventually leads to weakening social loyalty to the whole political system 
(Lipset 1995, 231). The most frequent ways of realization of political 
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participation are universal elections and direct democracy institutions. Due to 
the uncertain effect condition, both forms are regarded as the sine qua non of 
treating the political system in democratic categories (Przeworski 1991, 13). 
Even in the time of Athenian democracy, making decisions with the use of clay 
tablets or pebbles (called psēphos) led to citizens' participation in the decision-
making process, granting it social legitimization, although it did not involve all 
the citizens but only authorized ones (Wohl 2015, 53). 
 
The aim of this article is to compare the level of application of direct democracy 
mechanisms at the local and national level in Poland. The research was inspired 
by diverse institutional positions of direct democracy instruments in the Polish 
political system. The national ones are based on the Constitution of 1997, which 
gives them the status of high significance. But on the other hand, especially 
regarding formal conditions, it functionally limits their possible application. 
Local direct democracy institutions are normatively based on lower order acts 
(laws), which are much easier to amend. Hence, they are more adaptable to 
changing political and social conditions. Our thesis is that the use of direct 
democracy mechanisms is more intensive at the local level. From the 
psychological point of view, if citizens use the mechanisms of direct democracy 
available at the local level, they have the sense of influence on their closest 
environment. It is important from the perspective of the developing social 
responsibility for the common good. It is an integral element of civil society: 
individuals who collaborate, plan, and participate in making decisions that are 
important for them. Probably the effect of participation in decision-making at 
the local level is more tangible for citizens than in the case of national level 
decisions. Firstly, it concerns their vicinity, so they are able to better monitor 
the consequences of decisions they make. Secondly, the authorities initiating 
such processes are often well known to the residents, which may also generate 
a greater desire to engage in the processes. What is important, unlike in the 
national process, participation in making decisions at the local level is 
motivated by citizens' greater knowledge on the subject of voting, their greater 
experience, as well as interest in the results of the final decisions.  
 
The reflection begins with a theoretical discussion of direct democracy 
mechanisms occurring in Poland. Then, we discuss the functioning of direct 
democracy mechanisms at both levels. In the conclusion, we make six 
hypotheses regarding the determinants of the situation we have diagnosed 
empirically.  
 
 
2 MECHANISMS OF DIRECT DEMOCRACY  
 
The contemporary direct democracy is not limited to universal participation in 
the making of socially relevant decisions. In the simplest approach, two forms of 
direct democracy can be identified: procedural and sovereign (Ulicka and 
Wojtaszczyk 2003, 174). The former case mainly involves the citizens' right to 
influence the authorities. Expressing their expectations and communicating 
with politicians, citizens can determine the character and form of the adopted 
solutions. The sovereign form of direct democracy involves the existence of 
instruments used to establish law or to directly affect the form of political 
institutions (Lijphart 1977, 176). The collective will expressed by the members 
of the community obliges the authorities to act with consideration of social 
preferences.  
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The scope of using direct democracy institutions as a form of making executive 
decisions alternative to decisions made by politicians is connected with 
references to the political system. Its specificity involves both normative and 
functional limitations. The most important ones are: (1) the availability of direct 
democracy instruments, (2) political tradition; (3) the form of political regime; 
(4) previous effects of their application; (5) the significance of the issues to 
decide about (Fiorino and Ricciuti 2007). Two least obvious references are 
worth pointing out in this inventory. The form of political regime shows that the 
issues of relationship between different types of authority (especially between 
the legislative and the executive) are important for the possible application of 
direct democracy instruments. In the case of a regime determined by strong 
competence of executive authority (e.g., the president or prime minister elected 
in a direct election, supported by a considerable parliamentary majority), direct 
decision-making may be preferred. The range of issues than can be settled using 
direct democracy procedures may result from the occurrence of relevant 
subject exemptions (Lupia and Matsusaka 2004, 463–482).  
 
The inventory of direct democracy institutions is not finite. The development of 
democratic procedures and the community's self-government at various levels 
means that new, often innovative mechanisms of direct decision-making 
sometimes emerge (Matsusaka 2004, 157–177). The original classic ones, such 
as people's legislative initiative, a referendum, people's assembly, people's veto, 
a plebiscite or consultations, have recently been supplemented with the recall 
procedure and participatory budgeting (Toplak 2013, 31–33). In people's 
legislative initiative, which dates back to the ancient times, it is assumed that a 
group of citizens can move to change the law. A referendum is the form of 
making decisions by way of voting, in which the citizens vote for or against a 
certain solution. People's assembly is a form of making decisions at a specific 
location and time by all the authorized individuals. People's veto is a form of 
objection to an already adopted law or decision made by political authorities. A 
plebiscite is an institution similar to a referendum, but due to the subject 
(usually issues concerning a territory's belonging to a certain state or voting for 
or against the ruling authorities), it is weightier. Public consultations are a form 
of expressing public opinion, although authorities of another level make actual 
decisions concerning the subject. The recall procedure is an instrument of 
recalling individuals from public offices by way of vote (Musiał-Karg 2012, 32–
45). Participatory budgeting is a mechanism of distributing financial resources 
on the basis of citizens' vote, as they express their preferences regarding the 
available goals (Sintomer, Herzberg and Röcke 2008, 164–178). 
  
However, the application of direct democracy institutions is subject to certain 
rigors. According to Jack Haman, issues related to having power and putting an 
appropriate effort in political activity are a permanent limitation of the possible 
application of direct democracy procedures (Haman 2003, 60). In the case of 
representative democracy, two stages of decision-making occur. The general 
part of the problem to decide about, which is presented to all the voters, must 
have a simple structure so that an average citizen would be able to understand 
and analyse it. This assumption means that voters can choose e.g., to support a 
party or candidate in the election on the basis of the knowledge they have. Yet, 
the level of complexity of decisions to make is often much higher, so an average 
citizen may not be able to predict their consequences and may not understand 
the reasons for making them (Bingham Powell 1982, 2–4). In order for 
decisions made in this situation to be rational and effective, they need to be 
entrusted to representatives, who should have relevant resources to analyse the 
consequences of each potential solution. These resources are e.g., time needed 
for familiarizing oneself with the problem, effort put in its analysis, abilities 
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resulting from one's competence, and advisory base of political activists 
(Haman 2003, 60).  
 
Another limitation that can affect the efficiency of direct democracy institutions 
is legitimization issues. Decisions made by way of referendum may not 
legitimize political decisions, in accordance with the principle of respecting 
arithmetic majority. In addition, they may contribute to deepening the divisions 
in the society and conflicts arising from them. Therefore, referenda in 
contemporary democracies are relatively rarely used as a decision-making 
mechanism, with two important exceptions. The first exception is Switzerland 
and its political system preferring the reference to citizens' will in decision-
making (Hessami 2016, 270). The other exception is local referenda, which due 
to their subjects are often a convenient form of removing responsibility from 
the authorities and transferring it to all the citizens (Altman 2017, 1215). 
 
Another argument against the use of direct democracy institutions is the 
character of decision-making process in democracy. It may not seem very 
relevant, because in social awareness the institutions of direct democracy have 
attributes of greater weight resulting from the engagement of a large group of 
citizens in the decision-making process, thanks to which they have social 
legitimization (e.g., adopting the constitution by way of referendum). On the 
other hand, however, they may contribute to generating divisions and social 
conflicts. Therefore, decisions of the parliament of president elected in a 
universal election, made in accordance with the procedure and with 
participation of different bodies (e.g., in the legislation process) may have 
greater social approval than they would have if they had been legitimized in a 
referendum, which would lead to deep social divisions (Wojtasik 2013, 26–27). 
 
 
3 NATIONAL LEVEL  
 
General research on Poles' opinion on direct democracy institutions show that 
political procedures should be based on these institutions to a greater extent 
(Tybuchowska-Hartlińska 2014, 120). These expectations were also reflected in 
the formation of a political party called Direct Democracy, which advocates the 
need of direct democracy basis for the principles of political system (Glajcar, 
Turska-Kawa and Wojtasik 2017, 64–68). The analysis of the actual state shows, 
however, that except for their unconventional forms (recall and participatory 
budgeting), direct democracy institutions are relatively rarely used. Poles still 
attach greater importance to universal elections and their effects (Wojtasik 
2011, 213–215). The functional division into direct democracy and indirect 
democracy is based on the Constitution of Poland of 1997: Article 4 section 2 
provides that: “The Nation shall exercise such power directly or through their 
representatives.” In practice, institutions of direct democracy established in 
Polish law are: (1) nationwide referendum, which can be obligatory or optional; 
(2) legislative initiative for groups of at least 100 thousand citizens; (3) 
recalling a legislative or executive authority of a local government unit before 
the end of term by way of referendum; (4) residents of a local government unit 
expressing in a referendum their will concerning the way of solving problems 
concerning the community, within the responsibilities and power of the unit's 
authorities and in the case of important issues common for that community; (5) 
consultations with the residents of the local government unit, which may be 
obligatory or optional. Public consultations are a form of obtaining residents' 
opinion without binding effects; (6) legislative initiative of the members of the 
local government unit; (7) participatory budgeting. 
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Nationwide referendum experiences of citizens all over the country are not a 
motivational factor. In practice, after 1989, there have been only 5 nationwide 
referenda in Poland, two of which were obligatory (to confirm the Constitution 
and to give consent to the integration with the European Union). The others 
concerned universal enfranchisement of the citizens (1996), the ways of using 
state property (1996) and the ways of financing political parties and 
introduction of single-member electoral districts into the lower house of the 
parliament (2015). The participation threshold of more than a half of the 
citizens with the right to vote was only met in the case of the accession 
referendum (58.85%). In all the others, the voter turnout was significantly 
lower, and in the case of the 2015 referendum, it was only 7.8%. The relatively 
rare use of the institution of referendum at the national level results both from 
formal factors (complicated procedure of obtaining contest to conducting a 
referendum, the requirement of 50% voter turnout for the referendum to be 
valid, and the need to collect at least 500 thousand signatures supporting the 
motion for carrying it out) and political factors (politicians' reluctance to use 
forms of direct democracy as mechanisms limiting their power). It must be 
emphasized that political authorities initiated all the above-mentioned 
referendum initiatives, not by citizens themselves. Citizens' initiatives (with 
more than 500 thousand signatures of support) were overthrown in the lower 
house of the parliament, which must eventually agree to carry out each of them.  
 
These factors mean that the nationwide referendum is not likely to be regarded 
as a useful instrument of direct democracy in Poland. Strong party dependence 
of politics has a negative impact on reference to citizens' will as the ultimate 
way of settling political disputes. Party leaders prefer instrumentalizing the 
decision-making process by building up the majority in the parliament. This 
way, they can be sure both of the final decision and the course of working it out. 
The limited possibility of creating new political leaders through referendum 
campaigns is also important in this case. The emergence of new leaders during a 
nationwide referendum would be more probable if the problem to decide about 
was a socially popular one and not yet tackled by politicians. In this case, social 
mobilization could lead to creating a new political leader and an environment 
around the leader as a competition for the existing political parties. In the Polish 
conditions, an example of such a referendum was the 2015 initiative concerning 
the introduction of single-member electoral districts into the Sejm. It was 
proposed by the social movement Kukiz’15 and the presidential candidate 
Paweł Kukiz. But the way of carrying out the referendum initiative by president 
Bronisław Komorowski made a large part of the citizens ignore the voting on 
the subject.  
 
The non-regulatory form of direct democracy at the national level is people's 
legislative initiative. The Constitution of 1997 regulates the right to people's 
legislative initiative in Article 118 section 2, stipulating that: “The right to 
introduce legislation shall also belong to a group of at least 100,000 citizens 
having the right to vote in elections to the Sejm” Its non-regulatory character 
arises from two aspects. The first is the facultative character of further 
legislative procedure: the Sejm will decide whether the legislative initiative will 
actually lead to law establishment. The other one is the assumption that even if 
the people's legislative initiative is subject to legislative procedure, its ultimate 
effects depend on the Parliament. Apart from these limitations, there are also 
subject exemptions: a bill proposed by citizens may not refer to certain subjects. 
This applies to the areas the Constitution of the Republic of Poland reserves 
exclusively for other state bodies (e.g., adopting and changing the state's 
budget), to amending the Constitution, and to the powers of state bodies that 
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have been handed over to international organizations or international bodies. 
This last limitation results from the superiority of European laws, which cannot 
be changed by national acts. Thus, it excludes the performance of citizens' 
legislative initiative in this regard. 
 
Since the adoption of the Constitution in 1997 (i.e., since allowing people's 
legislative initiatives in the present form) until 2015 (the end of the 7th term of 
the Sejm), 143 attempts of people's legislative initiative were made, 53 of which 
were successful in meeting the formal requirements and proceeding the 
legislative initiative. Generally, the bills submitted by citizens are not very 
effective. In the discussed period, only 11 bills submitted by citizens were 
actually adopted (seven of which were proceeded together with other bills 
submitted by other entities). This data shows the relatively low effectiveness of 
people's initiatives. The impression is even stronger if we compare their 
number with all the bills in the years 1997-2015. In that period, only 0.9% (53) 
out of all bills submitted by entities with the right to do so (5,897) were based 
on people's legislative initiative. On the other hand, the specificity of the Polish 
political system means that citizens' participation in the legislative procedure is 
occasional; other state bodies are a more natural addressee of the legislative 
initiative procedure (Rachwał 2016, 166–171).  
 
 
4 LOCAL LEVEL 
 
The number of local governmental referenda in Poland, as well as people's 
interest in such referenda, are surprisingly low. Perhaps this originates in the 
sense that the mechanism is not very meaningful due to the lack of direct effect 
on the activities of the authority. They are usually used as part of the current 
policy, being the instrument of political competition. It is the same with the 
institution of legislative initiative of members of the local government unit. 
Political factors are to blame for using it so rarely: such motions are usually 
made by the opposition trying to achieve their political goals this way. As a 
result, although the bodies that are the addressees of these initiatives (councils 
of local government units) accept the motions (since they are legally obliged to 
do so), later they use procedural obstruction. In incidental cases, the authorities 
themselves use the procedure of legislative initiative. It happens whenever they 
need social legitimization of their activities, which they obtain by means of 
engaging citizens on their side. However, these are not really civil and bottom-
up activities. They are rather a form of manipulation with the public opinion.  
 
Social consultations are a more frequent local government level institution of 
direct democracy – in some cases they are simply required by law. This refers 
to procedures such as: (1) forming, combining, dividing, and abolishing local 
government units and determining their boundaries; granting a commune or a 
village the status of municipality and determining its boundaries; determining 
and changing names of communes and the seats of their authorities; (2) before 
adopting a resolution concerning the formation of a commune subunit on the 
initiative of an entity other than the residents; (3) before adopting the statute of 
a commune subunit; (4) before moving for the establishment if an additional 
name of a town in the language of a national or ethnic minority residing in that 
town; (5) determining, changing or abolishing the official names of towns, town 
districts, and physiographic objects. Optional consultations are usually 
organized in order to obtain social legitimization of planned activities.  
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The function of ensuring control of the authorities and enforcing political 
liability means that the logic of the electoral act may be reversed (the recall 
procedure). In the case of identifiable differences proving the local government 
specificity of performing them, there are no limitations on terms of office of 
rural commune heads and town mayors, and it is possible to apply the recall 
procedure in the form of referendum as an instrument of performing non-
electoral enforcement of political liability. This latter factor refers to communal 
councils, town mayors, and rural commune heads. A study by Maciej Marmola 
shows that Poles would definitely like to extend the application of the recall 
procedure to other publicly elected offices (Marmola 2015, 115–116). On the 
other hand, however, the effectiveness of recall procedures so far has been 
relatively low: only on 82 out of 641 cases the representative authority was 
effectively recalled (Marmola 2014, 68–77). Rafał Glajcar (2010, 73–77) points 
to two tendencies in the practice of application of a recall referendum, 
noticeable after the restitution of the local government in 1990. The first is the 
stabilization of their number in each term of office, except the years 1998-2002, 
when there were nearly twice as many attempts to recall local government 
authorities as on average (196 vs 104). The other tendency is the growing 
effectiveness of this instrument, from 6.25% of all the recall referenda carried 
out in the 1990-1994 term to 17.28% in the 2006-2010 term. This may be 
connected with the departure from the rigid threshold of referendum validity 
(30%) in favour of a flexible threshold depending on the strength of mandate 
(three fifth of the voter turnout at the election of the body). Its real reduction 
could have had two effects: the psychological one and the mathematical one. As 
for the psychological one, it is easier for citizens to believe that they are able to 
generate in the recall procedure the voter turnout that will make it possible to 
actually recall the authorities. The mathematical effect is based on the 
comparison of two levels of voter turnout, the lower of which is required to 
recall the body. 
 
Participatory budgeting is another institution of unconventional direct 
democracy (apart from the recall procedure) that is relatively often applied in 
Poland. It is noteworthy that it is a relatively new institution both in Poland and 
globally, established less than 30 years ago (Wampler 2010). The first town in 
Poland to apply participatory budgeting was Sopot in 2011. The very institution 
still arouses mixed feelings, especially among politicians. It results from fear of 
the loss of control of the budget, the belief that the councillors are about to lose 
the monopoly of making decisions concerning communes' budgets. On the other 
hand, the number of communes using this institution is dynamically growing. In 
2015, it was as many as 80 local governments. Interestingly, the communes that 
do use it are both big cities (primarily including Warsaw, which spends the 
equivalent of over 10 million euros as part of participatory budgeting), and 
small communes where the budgets do not exceed the equivalent of 25 
thousand euros. The clear success of participatory budgets in Polish communes 
seems to be a proof that citizens are more willing to engage in activities that 
give quick measurable effects (Wojtasik 2010, 158).  
 
Declaratively, Poles express substantial interest in the mechanisms of direct 
democracy, perceiving them as a necessary support for political structures. The 
opportunities Poles have for engaging in the decision-making process at the 
local level, such as referendum or legislative initiative, have poor support. 
Perhaps it is determined by perceiving those mechanisms as the instruments of 
political competition, which occurs both at the local and the national level in 
Poland. Local consultations are organized slightly more often. It is mostly 
connected with the necessity to carry them out as part of certain procedures. 
Optional consultations, in turn, are usually carried out in order to obtain higher 
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social legitimization of the planned activities. Citizens are clearly becoming 
more and more interested and engaged in unconventional mechanisms of direct 
democracy, such as recall and participatory budgeting. For one thing, these 
mechanisms are easier to implement. In addition, from the psychological point 
of view they give citizens a greater sense of agency: they have more real effects, 
which the citizens can experience themselves. 
 
 
5 CONCLUSIONS 
 
The described results of using direct democracy institutions at the national and 
local level show a much higher potential in the latter case, which confirms the 
thesis made in the beginning. At the national level, no functional sources of the 
need to apply direct democracy have been found in democratic procedures. So 
far, in Poland, its application has been the result of normative obligation rather 
than the real need of listening to the vox populi. At the local level, to the 
contrary, we can see, not only more intensive use of its procedures, but also 
adding new institutions (participatory budgeting). Looking for the 
determinants of this situation, the authors make six hypotheses that determine 
further research. 
 
5.1 Institutional barriers 
 
The first hypothesis identifies the reasons for the diagnosed situation in the fact 
that national referendum or people's legislative initiative require much greater 
financial and organizational resources than do the instruments of direct 
democracy at the local level. In the analysed cases, the need of collecting a 
sufficient number of signatures (500,000 for the referendum and 100,000 for 
the legislative initiative) was often a formal barrier, which some initiatives were 
unable to overcome. We can speculate, then, that some of the emerging 
initiatives were not carried out when their organizers became aware of the 
formal obstacles they would have to face. On the other hand, these barriers are 
a kind of safety mechanism, which protects the institutions of direct democracy 
from social and political devaluation. The devaluation could have occurred if the 
number of submitted initiatives had exceeded the limits of political reason.  
 
5.2 The monopolization of the political agenda  
 
The other hypothesis is that the diagnosed situation is the result of a political 
factor, namely that political parties and their leaders are responsible for 
limiting the number of initiatives at the national level. Despite numerous great 
slogans and programme ideas, in practice they are not interested in limiting 
their power by letting other entities (including citizens) participate in the 
decision-making process. The monopolization of the political agenda allows to 
control political competition processes, and thus to achieve the assumed goals. 
Introducing the factor of uncertainty (bottom-up citizens' initiatives) into the 
presented system of relationships means that the predictability of effects 
expected by politicians may be considerably reduced. The context of political 
leadership is also an important determinant. New initiatives connected with 
nationwide referenda or legislative initiatives could be the factor of creating 
new political leaders, who might pose a threat to the functioning ones.  
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5.3 Psychological factor 
 
The third hypothesis explains citizens' higher interest in local matters and the 
resulting higher potential of engagement in direct democracy initiatives at this 
level with reference to the psychological factor. An important element of this 
factor is the citizens' perception of how significant is the problem settled as part 
of direct democracy mechanisms. Local level problems are significantly closer 
to the citizens, more concrete and related to their responsibility for their 
proximity. What is more, this closeness means the voters have greater 
knowledge on the subject and are able to apply it in the decision making 
process. Local politics is an important sphere, connected with decisions that 
directly affect the functioning of the person in their place of residence. Citizens 
perceive such activity as more meaningful, because the initiative may refer to 
their closest environment, and hence, the quality of their lives. This will be a 
strong motivational factor, both for taking initiatives and for active 
participation in them. The greater sense of community involved in activity at 
the local level needs to be emphasized in the psychological factor. The citizens 
know each other and can exert stronger mutual influence by referring to 
common values and creating community goals. 
 
5.4 Local identity 
 
The fourth hypothesis involves a quantitative factor, which points to a much 
higher number of entities interested in creating their solutions at the local than 
the national level. Political activity at the local level is too greatly dependent on 
strong local identities, which are often institutionalized as local movements or 
associations. They integrate the local community by their activities, motivate 
them to participate in decision-making processes, and teach the people to take 
responsibility for their closest environment by encouraging them to participate 
in decision-making processes. It is often these communities that initiate the 
application of direct democracy mechanisms at the local level, since they can 
achieve their goals using those mechanisms. Well-developed local identity is the 
factor that strengthens the bonds with the entity (e.g., organization or 
association) that works to cultivate the residents' attachment to the location 
and regional identity. It is bound to give the sense of community and social 
representation. It is also a much more active initiator of direct democracy 
mechanisms as a collective entity with strong mutual support mechanisms and 
multiplied motivation force. To illustrate this difference, let us point out that the 
number of NGOs in Poland is more than 125 thousand, and the number of 
registered political parties is only 67 (as of 2017). 
 
5.5 Historic factor 
 
Lower interest in national level direct democracy institutions among the 
citizens may also result from the Polish history, which is the fifth hypothesis. 
Nearly fifty years of control by the Soviet Union, the lack of real political 
leadership and democratic rules may have led to the situation in which civic 
competencies have not developed well enough to allow the proper engagement 
in social matters (Wiatr 2018, 5–6). The processes of democratic socialization 
since 1989 may not have yet generated the necessary level of civic behaviours. 
Another historically significant aspect of the current form of civic engagement is 
the level of Poles' social integration. It may also be affected by the fact that the 
current territory of Poland is composed of lands that 100 years ago still 
belonged to the 3 powers of the time: Prussia, Russia, and Austria-Hungary. 
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Studies on political attitudes and voting behaviours show considerable 
differences overlapping with the boundaries of the occupants (Turska-Kawa 
and Wojtasik 2010, 11).  
 
5.6 Specific structure of Polish religiosity  
 
Our last hypothesis is the conjecture that the nature of religious structure may 
have an influence of Poles' engagement in social issues. However, it is hard to 
clearly define the direction of the influence, and this area definitely requires 
further research. It is important because Poland is a country with considerable 
religious homogeneity, where more than 90% of the community declare to be 
Catholics. It is a specific kind of religiosity (Turska-Kawa and Wojtasik 2017, 
189–191), serving as a catalyst for citizens' activity. In research on social 
motivations, scholars do not agree as to the impact of religion. On the one hand, 
some hold the view that the religious factor is significant in motivating for 
activity (Putnam 2000; Musick and Wilson 2008, 279), that the sphere of 
religious axiology is related to social values (Leege 1993, 3–26; Harris 1994, 
42–68) and that religious institutions serve socialization functions (Jones-
Correa and Leal 2001, 751–770; Greenberg 2000, 377–394). The opposite view 
stresses the possibility of reducing the level of social activity by religious 
participation (Wuthenow 1999, 331–363), the competitive character of citizens' 
trust in their own religious group at the expense of the general social capital 
(Uslaner 2000, 569–590), or even religious activity reducing citizens' 
knowledge and social competencies (Scheufele, Nisbet and Brossard 2003, 300–
324). Thus, we may make the thesis that due to the specific structure of Polish 
religiosity, the religious factor will have a strong impact, but it is hard to clearly 
determine the direction of this impact and its consequences for interest in local 
and national issues. The analyses may be directed by the fact that religiosity in 
Poland has the ludic character and by the lack of intensive laicization processes, 
unlike in many European countries (Burke 2009; Stawrowski 2004). The ludic 
character of religiosity means that it is dominated by non-liturgical practices. 
Popular religiosity involves anything that in classic theology was called 
paraliturgy or services. Such religiosity, although frequently considered to be 
immature, ensures the sense of meaning and helps form one’s identity. In 
Poland, its fundamental features are the mass character (intensity of religious 
practices) and ceremonial character (observance of holidays and customs). 
Another expression of ludic religiosity is its close association with local customs 
and tradition of the region. It is not individual but is based on a specific 
community. This could also suggest focusing more activity on local than 
national issues.  
 
The beginning of 2018 brought more changes in the normative situation of 
direct democracy institutions in Poland. The Act of 11 January 2018 on 
amending some laws so as to increase citizens' participation in the process of 
electing, functioning and control of some public bodies regulated that 
participatory budgeting would be mandatory in the biggest Polish cities (with 
powiat rights). The amount of the participatory budget will be at least 0.5% of 
the expenditure presented in the latest submitted report of budget 
performance. Some changes were also introduced in legislative initiative in local 
governments. In a commune up to 5 thousand residents, at least 100 persons 
can submit a legislative initiative, in a commune up to 20 thousand residents at 
least 200, and in a commune over 20 thousand residents at least 300. In the 
case of a powiat up to 100 thousand residents, the minimum of 300 persons 
have the legislative initiative, and in a powiat over 100 thousand residents, 500. 
In a province, this right is granted to a group of at least 1 thousand residents. 
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These regulations give more empowerment to the residents in relation to 
legislative and executive authorities in communes. They also extend the scope 
of local government legislative initiative to all the levels of local government.  
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